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Abstract
In much of the developing world, many farmers grow crops for local or personal consumption
despite export options which appear to be more profitable. Thus many conjecture that one or
several markets are missing. We report here on a randomized controlled trial conducted by
DrumNet in Kenya that attempts to help farmers adopt and market export crops. DrumNet
provides smallholder farmers with information about how to switch to export crops, makes in-
kind loans for the purchase of the agricultural inputs, and provides marketing services by
facilitating the transaction with exporters. The experimental evaluation design randomly assigns
pre-existing farmer self-help groups to one of three groups: (1) a treatment group that receives
all DrumNet services, (2) a treatment group that receives all DrumNet services except credit, or
(3) a control group. After one year, DrumNet services led to an increase in production of export
oriented crops and lower marketing costs; this translated into household income gains for new
adopters. However, one year after the study ended, the exporter refused to continue buying the
cash crops from the farmers because the conditions of the farms did not satisfy European export
requirements. DrumNet collapsed in this region as farmers were forced to sell to middlemen and
defaulted on their loans. The risk of such events may explain, at least partly, why many
seemingly more profitable export crops are not adopted.
JEL Codes: O12, Q17, F13.
Keywords: Field Experiment, Export Crop, Food Safety Standards 2  
1. Introduction 
Why do farmers continue to grow crops for local markets when crops for export 
markets are thought to be much more profitable? Several answers are possible: missing 
information about the profitability of these crops, lack of access to the necessary capital 
to make the switch possible, lack of infrastructure necessary to bring the crops to export 
outlets, high risk of the export markets (e.g., from hold-up problems selling to exporters), 
lack of human capital necessary to adopt successfully a new agricultural technology, and 
misperception by researchers and policymakers about the true profit opportunities and 
risk of crops grown for export markets. 
We conduct a clustered randomized control trial with DrumNet, a project of Pride 
Africa, to evaluate whether a package of services can help farmers adopt, finance and 
market export crops, and thus make more income. The experimental design includes two 
treatments, one with credit and one without, and a control group. The intervention is a 
package of services. Thus, the design does not permit isolating the reasons for the failure, 
with the exception of credit. In addition to evaluating the impact of these packages, we 
examine whether there are heterogeneous treatment effects on the basis of prior 
experience growing export crops. 
This experiment is motivated by a recent push in development to build sustainable 
interventions that help complete missing markets (e.g., the initiative launched jointly in 
2006 by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation). Other 
similar interventions include the use of mobile phones to obtain real-time prices for fish 
in markets along the shore by boat owners returning with their catches (Jensen, 2007) and  3  
an intervention in India to provide internet kiosks in small villages in order to better 
inform villagers of market opportunities (Upton and Fuller, 2005).  
Two approaches seem plausible for measuring impact of such interventions: one 
infers impact by examining the convergence of market prices (Jensen, 2007); a second 
compares the welfare, or change in welfare, of participants and non-participants. We 
employ the second approach. This design requires the assumption that there is no general 
equilibrium effects as a result of the intervention (e.g., increase of prices of non-export 
crops as a result of many farmers taking up export crops), and evidence we present 
supports this assumption.  
To evaluate such a program, one should be concerned that entrepreneurial and 
motivated individuals (those with the unobservable “spunk”) are most likely to 
participate; hence a randomized control trial seems necessary in order to measure the 
impact of such interventions convincingly. To the best of our knowledge, no such 
randomized controlled trial has been completed to date on an export crop adoption and 
marketing intervention. The literature on agricultural extension services, reviewed by 
Birkhaeuser et al. (1991) and Anderson and Feder (2003), and on technology adoption, 
reviewed by Feder et al. (1985) stress that both data quality and methodological issues 
are important qualifiers to the prevailing evidence in favor of high returns from extension 
or adoption. They conclude that more evaluative work is needed to better assist 
policymakers.
1 
We find positive but not overwhelming one-year impacts from DrumNet. 
DrumNet leads to more farmers growing export crops, increasing their production and 
                                                 
1 Foster and Rosenzweig (1995), Bandiera and Rasul (2004), Conley and Udry (2005) and Munshi (2004) 
also review the literature on agricultural technology adoption but focus on the role of social learning as a 
driver of adoption. This is the topic of our companion paper Ashraf, Gine and Karlan (2007).  4  
lowering their marketing costs. While we do not find a statistically significant impact on 
income for the full sample, we do find a statistically and economically significant 
increase for first-time growers of export oriented crops. 
The epilogue to this project is more dismal. One year after the evaluation ended, 
the export firm that had been buying the horticulture stopped because of lack of 
compliance with European export requirements (EurepGap). This led to the collapse of 
DrumNet as farmers were forced to undersell to middlemen, leaving sometimes a harvest 
of unsellable crops and thus defaulting on their loans. Afterwards it was reported to us 
anecdotally that the farmers returned to growing local crops. We discuss the implications 
(albeit without direct evidence): farmers may not be adopting export crops because of the 
risk of the export market. 
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides some background information 
regarding the Kenyan horticultural market and the DrumNet program. Section 3 describes 
the research design in more detail. Section 4 analyzes the decision to participate in 
DrumNet. Section 5 analyzes the impact of DrumNet. Section 6 discusses the viability of 
the DrumNet business model. Section 7 documents the EurepGap export requirements 
and Section 8 explains how its implementation affected DrumNet and concludes. 
2. The DrumNet Program and Context 
Kenya’s horticultural sector
2 has received a great deal of attention over the past 
decade due to the rapid and sustained growth of its exports to Europe (Jaffee 1994, 1995, 
2004; Dolan and Humphrey, 2000; Minot and Ngigi, 2002; Muendo and Tschirley, 
2004). In 2004, it exported over 30,000 tons of French beans to European markets. The 
                                                 
2 Horticulture sector is defined here to include fruit and vegetable production and marketing, but not 
flowers.  5  
UK absorbed more than 60 percent of exports, while France and the Netherlands captured 
15 and 12 percent, respectively. As explained in Markandya et al. (1999) and Asfaw et al. 
(2007), the strength of the Kenyan horticultural export sector can be attributed to (i) 
Nairobi’s role as an African hub for air transport, (ii) preferential treatment under the 
Lomé Convention between African Caribbean Pacific (APC) countries and the EU, and 
(iii) a critical mass of export firms with world-class management skills. Despite the lack 
of consensus on the actual contribution of small landholders to total horticulture exports
3, 
there is evidence suggesting that this contribution has declined over time, largely due to 
the cost and difficulty of complying with the new export production requirements that 
will be discussed in Section 7 (Okello and Swinton, 2007; Okello, Narrod and Roy, 2007; 
Jaffee 2004).  
When designing the DrumNet program, PRIDE Africa identified several stylized 
constraints that smallholder farmers faced. First, smallholder farmers had little 
information on pricing and exporting opportunities. Second, they lacked reliable 
production contracts with large brokers or exporters. Farmers feared international price 
fluctuations or believed that exporters would employ hold-up tactics given the 
perishability of the produce, such as lowering the promised price or grading the crop at a 
lower quality, while exporters feared that farmers would renege on their promise to sell 
back the produce or would misuse the inputs jeopardizing the quality of the crop. Third, 
farmers did not have relationships with financial institutions, and thus lacked access to 
                                                 
3 Estimates range from 30 percent in Dolan and Humphrey (2000) to 70 percent by the Horticultural Crops 
Development Authority, a parastatal agency funded by USAID, in Harris et al. (2001). Okello, Narrod and 
Roy (2007) report that while 60 percent of all French bean production in Kenya in the 1980s was done by 
smallholders, the share dropped to about 30 percent by 2003.  6  
credit, and finally, the farmers had difficulty coordinating and financing the use of trucks 
to transport the crop (see also Axinn, 1988; Kimenye, 1995; Freeman and Silim, 2002). 
DrumNet was therefore designed as a horticultural export and cashless micro-credit 
program that tried to overcome these barriers by linking smallholder farmers to 
commercial banks, retail providers of farm inputs, transportation services, and exporters. 
The model resembles an out-grower scheme (Grosh, 1994) but with one key difference. 
As a third neutral party, DrumNet hoped to convince both farmers and exporters that the 
other party would honor their commitment. In addition, with DrumNet there should be 
higher monitoring and information exchanges thanks to the frequent interaction between 
the staff and farmers.  
A farmer that wants to be a member of DrumNet has to satisfy the following 
requirements: (i) be a member of a registered farmer group (also known as self help 
group or SHG) with the Department of Social Services, (ii) express an interest, through 
the SHG, in growing crops marketed by DrumNet, namely French beans, baby corn or 
passion fruit, (iii) have irrigated land, and (iv) be able to meet the first Transaction 
Insurance Fund (TIF) commitment (roughly USD 10 or the equivalent of a week’s 
laborer wages). 
DrumNet clients first receive a four week orientation course in which the process is 
explained. Farmers learn about the need to employ Good Agricultural Practices on their 
farms to ensure the quality and safety of their produce, they open a personal savings 
account with a local commercial bank and, for those in the credit-treatment group, they 
make the first cash contribution to the Transaction Insurance Fund (TIF) that will serve as 
partial collateral for their initial line of credit. They also decide on the TIF percentage  7  
that DrumNet will automatically deduct from each future marketing transaction. 
Maximum loan size is four times their balance in the TIF. The initial TIF amount depends 
on the specific crop the farmer wants to grow and the area under cultivation.
4 
To ensure repayment, DrumNet organizes farmers into groups of 5 members each 
who are jointly liable for the individual loans taken out. At harvest time, DrumNet 
negotiates price with the exporter and arranges the produce pick-up at pre-specified 
collection points. Usually, there is a collection point for every 4 or 5 SHGs. In each 
collection point, a transaction agent is appointed among the members to serve as liaison 
between DrumNet and the farmers.
5 At these collection points, farmers grade their 
produce and package it, although the exporter has the final word on the grading.
6 
In the credit-treatment group, DrumNet also works with local agricultural retail 
stores to coordinate the in-kind loans. The retailers are trained in basic DrumNet record 
keeping and submit receipts to DrumNet to receive payment.  
Once the produce is delivered to the exporter at the collection points, the exporter 
pays DrumNet who in turn will deduct any loan repayment, pre-specified TIF percentage 
and credits the remainder to individual bank savings accounts that each farmer opened 
                                                 
4 For example, passion fruit in one quarter of an acre requires an investment of Ksh 5,000 (USD 67) but 
does not bear fruit for 6 months. The initial TIF for passion fruit is Ksh 1,250. French beans and baby corn 
only require an investment of Ksh 3,000 per one quarter of an acre and harvesting takes place after 3 
months. In Kirinyaga, both French beans and baby corn can be grown and harvested all year. 
 
5 Transaction agents are responsible for coordinating activities within farmer groups. The number of these 
agents has expanded from approximately 10 in early 2004 to 35 in January 2005. One member of each new 
farmer group is nominated as the transaction agent, receives additional training, and serves as the main 
point of contact for DrumNet, facilitating the market transactions. These farmers communicate frequently 
with the DrumNet staff, both in person in the office and via mobile phones. They are an important conduit 
of information about pickup schedules, market prices, approved field practices, and shifting grading 
standards. 
 
6 Anecdotal evidence suggest that some export buyers arbitrarily change the rejection rate especially in 
periods of oversupply (Okello and Swinton, 2007), but we have no evidence that the buyer from DrumNet 
engaged in such practices.    8  
when they registered. Initially, DrumNet focused on passion fruit, a profitable but 
challenging crop sold both in export and local markets. The favorable climate and small 
farms in Kirinyaga favors this fruit crop. Beginning in 2004, the DrumNet team began 
also to support the production of two other crops in high demand with Kenyan exporters: 
French beans and baby corn. These crops have additional advantages over passion fruit 
— they are less capital intensive, simpler to grow, and have shorter growing periods 
leading to faster economic returns. Because of this, very few SHG members that 
participated in DrumNet decided to grow passion fruit. Instead, they focused on French 
beans and, to a lesser extent, baby corn. The type of French beans chosen by DrumNet is 
the extra fine from the amy variety, exported as fresh produce and preferred by the UK 
supermarkets. Due to its higher labor requirements, it is better suited for smallholder 
farms than the bobby type from the paulista variety, mainly produced for canning by 
larger plantations.  
3.  Data and Design of Evaluation 
The evaluation was conducted in the Gichugu division of the Kirinyaga district of 
Kenya. First, in December 2003, we collected from the Ministry of Agriculture a list of 
all horticulture SHGs in Gichugu that had been registered since 2000. There were 96 
registered SHGs comprising approximately 3,000 farmers, although many of these 96 
were inactive or disbanded groups. After screening out the inactive or disbanded groups 
(via a brief filter survey to the SHG leader), we were left with 36 viable SHGs for the 
evaluation.  
We randomly assigned the 36 SHGs into three experimental groups of 12 SHG’s 
each: (1) “treatment-credit”: all DrumNet services, totaling 373 individuals, (2)  9  
“treatment-no credit”: all DrumNet services except credit, totaling 377 individuals, and 
(3) “control”: no DrumNet services, totaling 367 individuals. Figure 1 presents a map of 
Gichugu with the location of the treatment and control SHGs.
7   
After the randomization was done, we verified that the three groups were similar 
statistically on the limited variables available from the filter survey (i.e., number of 
members in 2004, SHG age since creation, access to paved road, percentage of members 
that were already growing export oriented crops, etc.). Table 1a reports these 
orthogonality checks. Column 4 reports the p-value of the t-test of the differences 
between the treatment group and the controls. Column 5 and 6 then show the breakdown 
for each of the two treatment groups, and column 7 reports the p-value of the F-test that 
neither coefficient for the two treatment groups is equal to zero.  Although credit SHGs 
start off slightly worse than control SHGs in terms of infrastructure and remoteness, 
overall the three experimental groups seem quite similar. Note that in the analysis, since 
we have baseline data, we will include SHG fixed effects and all baseline controls of 
Table 1b. Thus any remaining differences in levels of fixed characteristics (but not trends 
in time-varying characteristics) that occurred due to the small sample will be controlled 
for through the SHG fixed effects and individual-level baseline control variables. 
In April 2004, immediately after the filter survey was completed, we conducted a 
baseline of 726 farmers from the selected 36 SHGs. At the time of the baseline survey, 
DrumNet had not yet started operations or marketing, and thus no one had heard of it. 
During the follow-up survey in May 2005, we expanded the sample to include 391 
                                                 
7 Since the area is rather small, potential contamination of the control group is a concern. However, in the 
follow-up interview fewer than 15 percent of members in control SHGs had heard about DrumNet.  10 
additional SHG members registered at the time of the baseline but not included in the 
baseline survey. See Figure 2 for a Timeline of Events.  
Table 1b compares the baseline characteristics across treatment and control groups. 
All members used in the analysis were registered members at the time of the baseline. 
Table 1c reports the number of observations per variables at baseline and at follow-up. 
Some variables have at most 726 non-missing observations if the information was only 
elicited in April 2004 or 1,117 if we also asked the question retrospectively at follow-up 
for the additional sample of 391 members that were included in the follow-up but were 
not in the baseline. We reached 86% of the baseline individuals in the follow-up survey.  
Appendix Table 1 compares the baseline characteristics of those reached in the follow-up 
to those not reached. 
About half of the household income of these farmers came from farm activities, 
while the rest came from employment (both formal and informal), remittances, or 
pensions and gifts. Most farmers own the land they cultivate, and the median farm size 
was one acre. Farmers grew subsistence crops (beans, maize, potatoes, and kale) half of 
the time and cash crops such as coffee, bananas, or tomatoes 34 percent of the time. Only 
twelve percent of the farmers were already growing French beans, and nobody baby corn, 
the main horticulture crops promoted by DrumNet. 
Farm operations are typically done using only manual human labor, with fewer than 
five percent utilizing animal labor or machinery to boost productivity. This is not 
surprising given the small size of the farms. In addition, three quarters of those surveyed 
rely solely on family labor, not requiring hired labor to plant or harvest crops.  11 
To market their produce, nearly all used the traditional networks of brokers, resellers, 
and other intermediaries (see also Harris et al., 2001). A few marketed produce directly to 
consumers locally, and none reported marketing their produce in regional market centers 
or directly to large-scale end-buyers.
8 Only six percent of the farmers reported access to 
motorized transport (public transport, car, or truck) for hauling their produce; nearly all 
transport by foot, bicycle, or animal drawn cart. Most farmers have little control over 
which intermediaries they work with – three-quarters reported having relationships with 
three or fewer brokers and a 45 percent reported working exclusively with a single 
broker. Most produce transactions are cash-on-delivery, and most occur at the farm gate. 
Although these traditional arrangements are convenient for the farmer, they erode any 
advantages of price comparison and informed decision making, generally placing the 
farmer at a disadvantage.  
4. Participation Decision  
Using the baseline data, we now examine the decision to participate in the program 
offered by DrumNet. We examine the take-up decision for two reasons. First, we want to 
examine potential distributional implications of this program. Are the better off farmers 
more likely to join, or does the program succeed in achieving its goal of reaching the 
poor? Second, by examining the take-up decision, we hope to learn something about why 
this intervention was potentially needed in the first place. 
While 41 percent of the members from credit groups joined DrumNet, only 27 
percent did so when credit was not included as a DrumNet service. If we look at SHGs 
                                                 
8 The prime exception was coffee, which in this region is almost exclusively marketed through 
cooperatives. 
  12 
rather than individuals, ten out of twelve SHGs in the treatment-credit group joined 
DrumNet, compared to only five out of twelve from the treatment group without credit. 
This provides some evidence that, at a minimum for increasing take-up, credit is 
perceived by farmers as an important factor for cultivation of export-oriented crops.  
Table 2 shows the determinants of participation in DrumNet. Column 1 examines 
both treatment groups and includes an indicator variable for the credit treatment. 
Columns 2 and 3 show the determinants of take-up for the credit and no-credit groups 
separately. Since the results in Columns 2 and 3 do not differ much, we focus here on the 
results from Column 1. 
We examine a few hypotheses regarding the take-up decision. First, is offering credit 
an important determinant? We find that the credit indicator is positive but not significant 
statistically. When the same specification is run including only the credit indicator (i.e., 
none of the other covariates), we find that it is significant at the 10 percent level (result 
not shown in tables). 
Second, are farmers who join more educated? If education is required to understand 
the potential benefits of DrumNet, we would expect a positive correlation. On the other 
hand, if educated farmers are already more advanced, accessing export markets, they may 
see no additional value in the DrumNet services and refuse the offer to join. We find that 
literacy, as defined by the self-reported ability to read and write, is positively correlated 
with joining DrumNet. 
Third, does household income predict take-up? This is particularly important to 
examine for the treatment groups separately, to examine whether DrumNet without credit  13 
only reaches those with higher income. We find no statistically significant linear 
correlation between household income and participation.   
Fourth, how does yield per acre in the previous season and landholdings correlate 
with take-up? We find that members in the credit group with relatively high harvest yield 
per acre are less likely to participate in DrumNet (p-value is 0.106). This perhaps is due 
to farmers with high yields being satisfied with what they grow and not wanting to 
change crop varieties. In addition, households with larger total landholdings are more 
likely to join DrumNet and the same is true for households of larger size (both are 
statistically significant).  
Fifth, we look at whether those who participate used more or less advanced prior 
farming practices. We may expect that more advanced farming techniques (accessing 
markets directly, hiring labor, using machinery, etc.) are indications of farmers willing 
and eager to take on new ideas to increase profits, or on the other hand may indicate 
farmers less in need of the services of DrumNet, hence less likely to participate. We find 
that those who sell directly to the market (i.e., do not use brokers) are less likely to join 
DrumNet. Those who use machinery and/or animals rather than just human labor are also 
less likely to join DrumNet, and using hired labor is also negatively correlated, but not 
significant statistically, with participation in DrumNet.    
Finally, we examine whether risk tolerance as measured through hypothetical choice 
questions on the survey instrument, are predictive of take-up. We find that it is 
uncorrelated with take-up. 
Overall, it seems that it is neither the wealthiest farmers nor those that use the most 
efficient techniques the ones that sign up for DrumNet, nor is it the poorest in the SHG,  14 
given the positive correlations of literacy and leadership in the SHG and take-up. This 
evidence points towards an inverted U-shape relationship between income and take-up, 
indicating that the wealthiest and poorest are least likely to join. Column (4) includes a 
quadratic term in log income. As expected, both the linear and quadratic term are 
significant and have the expected sign. The coefficients on the log income terms imply a 
maximum at the median log income: the further above and the further below median log 
income, the less likely an individual is to take-up DrumNet. This pattern is the same in 
both credit and no-credit group (not shown), thus we conclude that including credit in the 
package of DrumNet services does not change the composition of participants with 
respect to income.  
5. Impact of DrumNet 
Table 3 presents the basic impact analysis. We use both baseline and follow-up data 
to construct a difference-in-difference estimate of impact. We include fixed effects for 
each SHG and all individual-level baseline controls of Table 1b. The coefficient of “Post 
x Treatment” identifies the impact of DrumNet on farmer outcomes. In Panel A we report 
results for the pooled treatment groups, and in Panel B we separately estimate the impact 
of DrumNet with and without credit. The econometric specification is as follows: 
(1)   Yijt = αj + βPostt + δ Postt xTreatmentj + Xij’γ +  εijt,  
and 
(2)   Yij = αj + βPostt + δCPostt xCreditj + δNCPostt xNo Creditj  + Xij’γ +   εijt,  
where Yij  is the outcome measure, αj is a SHG fixed effect, Postt is a dummy that 
takes value 0 in 2004 and 1 in year 2005, Treatmentj is a dummy that takes value 1 is the  15 
SHG j is a treatment SHG, Xij is the set of baseline controls reported in Table 1b and εij is 
the error term, clustered within SHG. In specification (2), the dummies Creditj and No 
Creditj are defined analogously. We include the set of baseline controls because, despite 
the random assignment, assignment to treatment was correlated with certain observable 
characteristics. 
The outcome measures will walk through the agricultural process in order to 
examine at what steps DrumNet causes change. We examine, in chronological order: 
whether export crops are grown, the percentage of area devoted to cash crops, use of 
inputs, production of export crops, value of harvest, marketing expenditures and 
household income. We also examine use of lending or savings services from other formal 
financial institutions. 
First, we find the immediate effect on growing an export crop is strong and 
significant: treatment individuals are 19.2 percentage points more likely to be growing an 
export crop than control individuals, and likewise a greater proportion of their land is 
dedicated to cash crops (Columns 1 and 2). We do not find any increase in expenditure 
on inputs (Column 3). 
Next we examine production of export crops in Kgs and find large increases for baby 
corn but insignificant increases for French beans (Column 4 and 5). Most farmers that 
were already growing export crops were only growing French beans, not baby corn. 
Thus, the increased production of baby corn can be attributed to DrumNet entirely. The 
more difficult to measure outcomes of the value of the produce was positive but 
statistically insignificant (Column 6). Marketing expenditures were lower for treatment 
members compared to control members (Column 7).  16 
For the log of household income (Column 8), we find on the full sample a positive 
but statistically insignificant result. 
Finally, members in treatment SHGs seem to be obtaining loans for formal sources 
(other than DrumNet) and are also more likely to have a deposit with a formal institution 
(Columns 9 and 10). The finding on increased borrowing from formal sources is 
explained below. The finding on the increased number of members with a savings 
account in a formal institution is not surprising because DrumNet opened an account with 
all SHG members that did not have one previously to facilitate transactions. 
In Panel B, we estimate the intent-to-treat effect for the credit and no-credit groups 
separately. Surprisingly, despite the differential take-up rates, we do not find many 
significant differences between the credit and no-credit groups even on the intent-to-treat 
specification employed. This may be because the offer of credit may have changed the 
type of farmer who agreed to participate, and this “type” may be correlated with 
unobservables which effect success of the program. Note from the earlier discussion that 
we do not observe many differences in selection on observables between the credit and 
no-credit groups, but we also are only able to explain about one third of the variation in 
the take-up decision.  
In Table 4, we examine important heterogeneous treatment effects for those who 
were already growing DrumNet export crops versus those that were not. For each 
outcome variable we employ the above specifications (1) and (2), also presented in Table 
3. 
We find that those who benefit the most are precisely first-time growers of export 
crops. Prior growers do not devote more land to cash crops nor do they increase  17 
production of French beans, but first-time adopters do both. Both prior growers and new 
adopters increase their production of baby corn, since as mentioned before, baby corn 
was introduced by DrumNet. Interestingly, only prior growers perceive a reduction in 
marketing costs. This could be explained by the fact that first-time adopters were only 
selling at the farm-gate, while old adopters where hauling their produce to be exported to 
markets.  
Most importantly, we find here that income is significantly larger for first-time 
exporters, an increase of 31.9 percent for the pooled treatment group.  Panel B shows this 
broken down for the credit and no-credit group, but the difference between these two 
groups is not significant statistically (although the point estimate is higher for the non-
credit group).   
Using the marketing transaction data also collected at the time of the survey, we also 
tested whether treatment SHGs benefited from an access to higher prices than they would 
otherwise (note that whereas a large intervention of this sort may actually shift market 
prices, DrumNet, relative to the market as a whole, was too small to realistically cause 
general equilibrium shift in overall market prices). To examine prices available to 
farmers in the study, we use all transaction data available, including those conducted at 
farm-gate as well as at a local or distant market. The dependent variable is the price per 
relevant unit of the crop: Kg for French beans and coffee, 90 Kg bag for maize and beans 
and bunches for bananas. We run a pooled regression which includes crop fixed effects 
and a crop by crop specification for the main crops grown. Analogous to the impact 
Tables 3 and 4, all regressions include SHG fixed effects and all household baseline 
controls of Table 1b. Standard errors are also clustered at the SHG level, our unit of  18 
randomization. Table 5 reports the results. All coefficients of interest but one (No Credit 
x Post in the Maize regression), are insignificant, thus, we conclude that there are no 
differences between unit prices perceived by members of Treatment and Control SHGs 
even if Treatment group is split into Credit and No-credit groups. The point estimates of 
Treatment x Post in column (3) and Credit x Post and No credit x Post in column (4) are 
all negative and insignificant, indicating that treatment groups did not receive on average 
higher prices for French beans. The DrumNet administrative data show an average net 
transaction price in 2005 of Ksh 25 per Kg, compared to a lower mean transaction price 
for French beans in 2005 of Ksh 19.5 per Kg. Thus, while transactions with DrumNet 
were possibly more profitable than with middlemen, the average price of French beans in 
the treatment group fails to show it. Notice in contrast that the Post coefficient of French 
beans, maize and coffee is positive and significant, indicating that on average, the price 
of these crops was higher in 2005 than in 2004. Figure 3 plots the Kenya-wide price 
index of the same crops, taking year 2001 as the base year.
9 Consistent with the Post 
coefficient of Table 5, Figure 3 shows an increase in prices from 2004 to 2005 for the 
same crops.   
Finally, we interviewed the few local input suppliers that serve Gichugu and we 
found anecdotally that the price of inputs (fertilizer, pesticides and seeds) was not 
affected either by the presence of DrumNet. This is not surprising, since in aggregate 
DrumNet was fairly small compared to the market as a whole. 
 
                                                 
9 Price data for French beans and bananas come from the Horticultural Crops Development Authority 
(HCDA), for maize and beans come from the Regional Agricultural Trade Intelligence Network (RATIN) 
and finally prices for coffee come from the Nairobi Coffee Exchange.  19 
 6. Business Viability 
In this section we assess whether DrumNet was profitable from a business 
standpoint. The monthly cost of the DrumNet main regional office in Kerugoya for an 
average month during the study was KSh 93,000 (USD 1,200), and included the rental, 
salaries, transportation, utilities, marketing and communication expenses. In addition, the 
Kerugoya office benefited from two “market intelligence” offices in the nearby markets 
of Karatina and Wakulima where the staff would check on local prices and report to 
Kerugoya. These offices were fully staffed from January until June 2004, and were 
closed in December 2004. Therefore, the monthly costs for these two offices during the 
study period was KSh 3,860 (USD 50). These monthly costs do not include a motor 
vehicle owned by the Kerugoya office nor expenses from the Pride Africa Nairobi 
national office, even though DrumNet was a project of Pride Africa. 
At the time of the study, DrumNet was already operating with some SHGs that were 
growing passion fruit, French beans and baby corn. By the end of the study, they were 
working with 43 collection points, 14 of which were established for the study. In order to 
calculate the cost of the study to DrumNet, we calculate a monthly cost per collection 
point and multiply it by the number of study collection points.  
To compute the sustainability of DrumNet as a business, we compute the annualized 
cost of running DrumNet per member and compare it to the income generated from the 
commission that DrumNet charged in each transaction. DrumNet registered 294 farmers 
in the month of June 2004 for the study, although they did not start generating revenues 
until September 2004. Unfortunately, we only have administrative data from DrumNet 
for 2004, so we can only assess business profitability from June to December. Assuming  20 
a conservative 10 percent cost of funds, DrumNet made a net loss of Ksh 957 (USD 12), 
per client in the experimental SHG. One explanation for this loss is that the horizon we 
are considering is too short. In 2005, clients in the experimental SHG were already 
producing and marketing with DrumNet, although we lack the data to assess whether 
DrumNet made a profit over the one-year horizon. Needless to say, DrumNet was making 
a profit in 2004 with farmers in non-experimental groups that started before the 
evaluation, in other geographic areas of Kenya. 
7. International Food Safety Standards: The EurepGap requirements 
In this section we describe the requirements that the few Kenyan smallholders who 
have succeeded over the years in producing for the export market face since the 
implementation of the EurepGap in January 2005. These requirements are established in 
the protocol for Good Agricultural Practices (GAP) of the retailer members (mostly 
supermarkets) of Euro-Retailer Produce Working Group (EUREP) and are a response to 
rising litigation from European consumers following several food safety scandals (Jaffee, 
2004; Mungai, 2004; Okello, Narrod and Roy, 2007). These requirements aim to ensure 
the production of safe, high quality food using practices that reduce the impact of farming 
on the environment. Exporters must be able to trace production back to the specific farm 
from which it came in order to ensure safe pesticide use, handling procedures and 
hygiene standards. 
Export growers have to be certified, either individually or as a group. Certification is 
obtained during an on-farm inspection and has to be renewed every year. A SHG that 
seeks certification has to be registered with the Ministry of Culture and Social Services. 
SHG members have to draft a group constitution and sign a resolution stating their desire  21 
to develop a Quality Management System and to seek EurepGap certification. The 
Quality Management System involves the construction of a grading shed and a chemical 
storage facility with concrete floors, doors and lock and proper ventilation as well as 
latrines with running water. In addition, they need to keep written records for two years 
of all their farming activities, both at the group and individual level, including the variety 
of seeds used, where they were purchased, the planting date, agro-chemicals used, exact 
quantities and date of application. Spraying equipment must be in good working 
condition and the person doing the spraying must wear protective gear. Farm chemicals 
must be carefully stored under lock in a proper storage facility and in their original 
containers. The water used for irrigation must be periodically checked. Finally, every 
grower’s produce needs to be properly labeled.  
Asfaw et al. (2007) estimate that the cost of compliance with EurepGap standards 
per farmer under the group certification option is Ksh 45,000 (USD 581), including Ksh 
34,600 investment in infrastructure (toilet, grading shed, fertilizer and chemical stores, 
waste disposal pit, pesticide disposal, charcoal cooler, protective clothing, sprayer, etc) 
with an average life of 7.8 years and Ksh 10,400 in recurrent yearly expenses (application 
for SHG and water permit, record keeping, audits, water and soil analysis, etc).
10,11 Most 
SHGs that have been certified have not typically covered these expenses on their own. 
Donors have helped farmers make the investments in infrastructure while exporters pay 
                                                 
10 These costs do not include the Pesticide Residue Analysis to check maximum residue level (MRL) 
compliance. Because it has to be done in every farm and is fairly expensive (Ksh 8,000 to 20,000 or USD 
200 per farm), some exporters do not test the produce they buy for residue content but their European 
buyers will occasionally test random sample and will notify them if there are problems (Okello and 
Swinton, 2007). 
11 Okello, Narrod and Roy (2007) present alternative group certification costs gathered records and 
informal interviews with farmers, group leaders and certification companies. The costs are Ksh 439,000 
(roughly USD 6,000) for the group, which amounts to Ksh 29,264 (roughly USD 400) per farmer assuming 
groups of 15 members.  22 
for part of the recurring expenses. But if help from donors and exporters is not 
forthcoming, smallholder farmers may find it difficult to obtain certification. Given our 
results, the costs of compliance during the first year are more than twice the net gain of 
first-time adopters.   
As a result, as predicted by several authors and the Kenyan press (see Farina and 
Reardon, 2000 and the article by Mungai in the Daily Nation) most Kenyan exporters 
have reduced their involvement with small-scale growers after the introduction of 
EurepGap (Graffman, Karehu and MacGregor, 2007). 
According to an independent survey fielded by International Development Research 
Center (IDRC) in November 2004 in the same region where DrumNet operates, farmers 
reported having heard about the EurepGap requirements although they were unable to 
give specific details. Regardless, they seemed overconfident about their ability to obtain 
certification. Although EurepGap compliance was made mandatory in January 2005, it 
was not until mid 2006 that the exporter in partnership with DrumNet ceased to purchase 
the produce from DrumNet SHGs since they lacked certification. In the next section we 
describe the fate of DrumNet SHG after European export markets became inaccessible.  
 
8. Conclusion and Epilogue 
We examine whether an intervention to help smallholder farmers access export 
markets can change farmer practices and improve household income.  We find that the 
program succeeds in getting farmers to switch crops, and that the middle income farmers 
were the most likely to take-up (relative to low-income and high-income).  23 
Comparing members that were offered credit to those that were not, we find that 
credit increases participation in DrumNet but does not translate into higher income gains 
relative to the non-credit treatment group. This suggests that access to credit is not 
necessarily the primary explanation for why farmers are not accessing these markets on 
their own. 
We find a significant increase in household income but only for farmers who were 
not previously accessing export markets. This implies that in order to generate positive 
economic returns at the household level, such interventions should focus intensely on 
deepening outreach to new farmers, not merely facilitating transactions for farmers 
already exporting crops. 
As with any empirical research, external validity is of utmost concern. These 
results are encouraging; profitable solutions exist to improve horticultural choices by 
farmers and increase household income. However, as with any program, many local 
conditions and organizational characteristics may have been necessary conditions for 
finding these positive impacts. Furthermore, the heterogeneous results regarding credit 
and no-credit require further research to understand more fully. With further carefully 
designed evaluations, we can learn more about why these interventions are necessary in 
the first place, and such information can then be used for designing even better 
interventions that focus directly on the source of the problem. 
The epilogue to this project is not good. One year after the follow-up data were 
collected, the exporter refused to continue buying the crops from DrumNet farmers since 
none of the SHGs had obtained EurepGap certification. DrumNet lost money on its loan 
to the farmers and collapsed, but equally importantly farmers were forced to sell to  24 
middlemen, sometimes leaving a harvest to rot. As reported to us by DrumNet, the 
farmers were outraged but powerless, and subsequently returned to growing what they 
had been growing before (e.g., local crops such as maize).  
Two lessons can be drawn from the DrumNet experience. First, on the positive 
side, DrumNet succeeded in building trust in the horticultural markets by convincing 
farmers to make specific investments even when some feared holdup problems with the 
export buyers, and by convincing buyers to trust farmers and purchase their produce. The 
second lesson, however, was that because DrumNet’s success depended on their farmers 
being certified, it should have secured the resources to cover the substantial infrastructure 
and maintenance costs to achieve it. The eventual collapse of the transactions thus may 
have generated a loss of trust, the exact problem DrumNet was designed to solve. 
  25 
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Appendix  
 
Age of member  Age of the SHG member 
Literacy Self-reported  ability to read and write 
Risk Tolerance 
Respondent had to choose among different bets with 
different risk and return tradeoffs. The available 
lotteries were: a.1000 KSh /1000 KSh, b. 900 KSh 
/1900 KSh, c. 800 KSh /2400 KSh, d. 600 KSh /3000 
KSh, e. 200 KSh /3800 KSh and f. 0 KSh /4000 KSh. 
Risk tolerance is the expected value of the bet chosen 
by the respondent minus the expected value of the 
1000/1000 (riskless) bet. 
Months as member in SHG  Number of months since the member became a SHG 
member. 
Member of SHG is an officer 
Dummy variable with value 1 if respondent was an 
officer (president, secretary or treasurer) of the SHG at 
the time of the baseline. 
Deposit in a formal bank  Dummy variable with value 1 if household has at least 
one deposit in a formal bank. 
Loan from formal institutions  Dummy variable with value 1 if household has at least 
one loan from a formal institution. 
Total household income 
Total value from the following sources of income: 
wages from agricultural labor; wages or salaries from 
other work; non-farm self-employment; sale of crops; 
sale of livestock, poultry and dairy; remittances from 
family members; pension, gifts or social assistance 
and other. It also includes total savings. The variable 
is reported in 1,000 KSh. 
Value of harvested produce 
The sum for all crops in each plot cultivated of the 
total amount harvested times the price per unit in a 
typical transaction. 
Harvest yield per acre  Value of harvest divided by total land holdings (acres) 
in 100,000 KSh. 
Proportion of land that is irrigated  Proportion of total land that uses some source of 
irrigation other than rain. 
Total landholdings (acres)  Total landholdings in acres 
Pct. Land devoted to cash crops  Percentage of land devoted to cash crops. 
Production of French beans  French beans production in 1,000 Kg 
Production of baby corn  Baby corn production in Kg 
Sells to market 
Dummy variable with value 1 if respondents reports 
having sold at least a crop at the village or a distant 
market.  
Total spent in marketing  Total cost of transport of a typical transaction times 
number of transactions that required transportation. 
Uses hired labor  Dummy variable with value 1 if household used hired  29 
labor during the last season. 
Grows export crops  Dummy variable with value 1 if household grows 
French beans, baby corn or passion fruit 
Use of Inputs  1 if household used manure or pesticides for crop 
production 
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Source: Prices for French Beans and Bananas come from the Horticultural Crops 
Development Authority (HCDA). Prices for Maize and Beans come from the Regional 
Agricultural Trade Intelligence Network (RATIN). Prices for Coffee come from the 
Nairobi Coffee Exchange. 
  33 
All Control Treatment Credit No credit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Current number of members 36 28.7 31.4 27.3 0.51 24.2 31.0 0.52
(17.5) (19.6) (16.6) (11.3) (21.3)
Age of SHG (months) 36 4.77 4.99 4.66 0.85 5.24 3.97 0.81
(4.89) (3.9) (5.39) (6.24) (4.37)
SHG has social activities (1 = yes) 36 0.53 0.75 0.42 0.06* 0.46 0.36 0.16
(0.51) (0.45) (0.5) (0.52) (0.5)
Fee contribution to the SHG per member 36 103 87.5 111 0.55 111 110 0.83
(106) (56.9) (124) (128) (126)
SHG has an account in the bank (1=yes) 36 0.64 0.67 0.63 0.81 0.62 0.64 0.97
(0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.51) (0.5)
Main road paved (1 = yes) 36 0.86 1.00 0.79 0.09* 0.69 0.91 0.07*
(0.35) (0) (0.41) (0.48) (0.3)
Km to main market 36 5.82 5.08 6.19 0.39 5.42 7.09 0.37
(3.6) (3.2) (3.79) (3.09) (4.46)
Time to the main market (minutes) 36 41.5 22.5 51.0 0.09* 65.0 34.5 0.06*
(47.1) (16) (54.6) (68.6) (25.3)
Data come from the SHG filter survey conducted in February 2004, prior to the start of the intervention. Column 3 includes all SHGs that received
DrumNet services including both the credit and no-credit treatment groups. Column 4 reports the difference between Treatment and Control
SHGs, and the t-stat on the mean comparison. Column 7 reports the regression analog to Column 4, except now with two indicator variables, one
for each treatment group. Specifically, we regress the group characteristic in each row on two indicator variables, and report the p-value for the F-
test that neither coefficient for the two treatment groups is equal to zero.   The symbol * represents significance at the 10 percent.
p-value
Table 1a
Pre-Intervention Self-Help Group Characteristics from Filter Survey
Means and Standard Deviations



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































All Control Treatment Credit No Credit All Control Treatment Credit No Credit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Member
Age of member 1,117 367 750 373 377 956 303 653 316 337
Literacy 1,117 367 750 373 377 956 303 653 316 337
Risk tolerance 726 263 463 216 247 956 303 653 316 337
Months as member in SHG 726 263 463 216 247 956 303 653 316 337
Member of SHG is an officer (1=yes) 1,117 367 750 373 377 956 303 653 316 337
Deposit in a formal bank (1=yes) 725 263 462 215 247 947 300 647 315 332
Loan from formal institutions (1=yes) 726 263 463 216 247 946 301 645 314 331
Logarithm of total annual household income 713 259 454 215 239 853 282 571 295 276
Number of Household members 726 263 463 216 247 956 303 653 316 337
Land
Harvest yield per acre (in Ksh 100,000) 726 263 463 216 247 956 303 653 316 337
Proportion of land that is irrigated 1,117 367 750 373 377 956 303 653 316 337
Total landholdings (Acres) 1,117 367 750 373 377 956 303 653 316 337
Proportion of land devoted to cash crops 990 302 688 344 344 789 267 522 289 233
Production
Grows export crops (1=yes) 1,052 334 718 355 363 889 268 621 298 323
Sells to market (1=yes) 726 263 463 216 247 956 303 653 316 337
Uses hired labor (1=yes) 1,117 367 750 373 377 956 303 653 316 337
Uses Machinery and/or animal force (1=yes) 1,117 367 750 373 377 956 303 653 316 337
Value of harvested produce (in Ksh 1,000) 699 257 442 208 234 904 289 615 302 313
Production of french beans (in 1,000 Kg.) 1,051 334 717 355 362 930 294 636 309 327
Production of baby corn (in Kg.) 1,051 334 717 355 362 930 294 636 309 327
Total spent in marketing (in Khs 1,000) 722 263 459 213 246 931 294 637 309 328
Use of inputs 1,032 317 715 354 361 790 267 523 290 233
Follow-up
Proportion of respondents reached at follow-up 0.86 0.83 0.87 0.85 0.89
Baseline Follow-up
Table 1c
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Post -0.004 -0.079 0.049 0.660 11.120 -7.094 3.569 -0.109 -0.053 0.123
[0.059] [0.018]*** [0.018]*** [0.769] [34.783] [5.136] [2.113] [0.097] [0.013]*** [0.029]***
Post x Treatment 0.192 0.043 -0.004 1.620 396.711 4.883 -3.531 0.087 0.044 0.070
[0.067]*** [0.023]* [0.019] [1.270] [99.618]*** [6.269] [1.781]* [0.110] [0.016]*** [0.036]*
Num. Observations 1983 1779 1822 1981 1981 1603 1653 1566 1672 1672













of baby corn 
(Kg.)















Post -0.004 -0.079 0.049 0.662 11.304 -7.147 3.558 -0.110 -0.053 0.123
[0.059] [0.018]*** [0.018]*** [0.770] [34.793] [5.136] [2.114] [0.097] [0.013]*** [0.029]***
Post x Credit 0.226 0.049 -0.009 2.338 460.965 2.164 -4.018 0.011 0.029 0.080
[0.077]*** [0.027]* [0.022] [1.759] [148.606]*** [9.098] [2.017]* [0.118] [0.022] [0.044]*
Post x No Credit 0.159 0.037 0.001 0.926 334.676 7.338 -3.103 0.162 0.057 0.062
[0.071]** [0.028] [0.020] [1.454] [125.350]** [6.175] [1.784]* [0.119] [0.014]*** [0.037]
Num. Observations 1983 1779 1822 1981 1981 1603 1653 1566 1672 1672
R-squared 0.27 0.13 0.07 0.21 0.07 0.26 0.02 0.16 0.05 0.17
Mean dep. variable 0.526 0.568 0.961 4.546 148.614 40.133 1.379 3.495 0.032 0.800
P-value of Test Post x Credit = Post x No credit
   0.291 0.695 0.534 0.481 0.507 0.567 0.484 0.116 0.176 0.629
The variable Post takes value 1 in year 2005, when Follow-up was conducted. The variable Treatment is an indicator variable equal to one if the member is in a
treatment SHG. The variables Credit and No Credit are indicator variables for each treatment group. All regressions are estimated using OLS with SHG fixed
effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the SHG level and reported in brackets below the coefficient. The symbol *,**,*** represent significance at the 10, 5
and 1 percent, respectively. Only SHG members at the time of the baseline are included in the regression. Controls: Age of member, literacy, member of SHG is
an officer (1=yes), proportion of land that is irrigated, total landholdings (Acres), uses hired labor (1=yes) and uses Machinery and/or animal force( 1 = y e s ) ,a n d





Panel B: Credit vs. No Credit




Grows export crops 
at baseline
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Post -0.099 -0.056 0.007 0.106 0.662 1.878 -17.879 64.576 -13.365 3.393 4.981 2.535 -0.129 -0.132 -0.068 -0.030 0.096 0.149
[0.016]*** [0.033] [0.005] [0.042]** [1.547] [0.875]** [31.020] [48.646] [10.010] [5.047] [3.343] [2.153] [0.094] [0.176] [0.016]*** [0.017]* [0.026]*** [0.041]***
Post x Treatment -0.020 0.090 -0.007 -0.033 -3.902 4.885 488.962 338.619 5.194 4.163 -6.495 -1.494 -0.032 0.319 0.055 0.025 0.072 0.075
[0.030] [0.040]** [0.007] [0.044] [2.055]* [2.085]** [128.038]*** [104.411]*** [12.658] [6.633] [3.318]* [1.914] [0.120] [0.182]* [0.022]** [0.022] [0.045] [0.051]
# Observations 818 909 822 947 894 1027 894 1027 774 770 800 793 764 744 802 799 802 799
R-squared 0.18 0.14 0.03 0.11 0.46 0.19 0.1 0.08 0.37 0.23 0.03 0.1 0.2 0.19 0.08 0.07 0.17 0.23
Grows export crops 
at baseline Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Post -0.099 -0.057 0.007 0.106 0.660 1.876 -17.528 64.570 -13.377 3.548 4.971 2.561 -0.130 -0.134 -0.068 -0.031 0.096 0.150
[0.016]*** [0.033]* [0.005] [0.042]** [1.548] [0.876]** [30.975] [48.661] [10.011] [5.030] [3.345] [2.158] [0.094] [0.176] [0.016]*** [0.017]* [0.026]*** [0.041]***
Post x Credit -0.026 0.122 -0.014 -0.032 -4.729 8.075 619.863 351.988 3.548 12.032 -7.553 -0.386 -0.012 0.219 0.059 -0.019 0.063 0.134
[0.033] [0.046]** [0.008]* [0.048] [2.313]** [2.604]*** [200.536]*** [136.257]** [15.795] [5.042]** [3.566]** [2.127] [0.140] [0.188] [0.031]* [0.025] [0.062] [0.049]***
Post x No Credit -0.013 0.059 0.004 -0.034 -2.854 2.405 323.076 328.227 7.325 -0.433 -5.156 -2.118 -0.061 0.384 0.051 0.049 0.083 0.042
[0.047] [0.043] [0.010] [0.045] [2.433] [2.569] [114.656]*** [144.763]** [13.827] [7.641] [3.256] [1.894] [0.140] [0.195]* [0.020]** [0.022]** [0.047]* [0.059]
#Observations 818 909 822 947 894 1027 894 1027 774 770 800 793 764 744 802 799 802 799
R-squared 0.18 0.14 0.03 0.11 0.46 0.2 0.1 0.08 0.37 0.23 0.03 0.1 0.2 0.19 0.08 0.08 0.17 0.23
Mean dep. Var 0.654 0.495 0.996 0.930 6.861 2.751 147.642 156.560 49.966 30.085 1.979 0.768 3.640 3.354 0.035 0.029 0.812 0.782
P-value of Test Post x Credit = Post x No credit
0.804 0.129 0.144 0.945 0.453 0.108 0.204 0.901 0.818 0.052 0.192 0.166 0.747 0.150 0.815 0.009 0.765 0.096
The variable Post takes value 1 in year 2005, when Follow-up was conducted. The variable Treatment is an indicator variable equal to one if the member is in a treatment SHG. The variables Credit and No Credit are indicator variables for each treatment
group. All regressions are estimated using OLS with SHG fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the SHG level and reported in brackets below the coefficient. The symbol *,**,*** represent significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent,
respectively. Only SHG members at the time of the baseline are included in the regression. Controls: Age of member, literacy, member of SHG is an officer (1=yes), proportion of land that is irrigated, total landholdings (Acres), uses hired labor (1=yes)
and uses Machinery and/or animal force (1=yes), and indicator variables for any missing values for each of the controls. 
Pct. Land devoted to cash 
crops
Logarithm of HH 
Income
Total spent in 
marketing (in Khs 
1,000)
 Value of harvested 
produce (in Khs 1,000)
Use of inputs
Production of french 
beans (1,000 Kg.)
Production of baby corn 
(Kg.)
Loan from Formal 
Institutions
Deposit in Formal 
Institutions
Panel B: Credit vs. No Credit
Pct. Land devoted to cash 
crops
Logarithm of HH 
Income
Loan from Formal 
Institutions
Use of inputs
Production of baby corn 
(Kg.)
 Value of harvested 
produce (in Khs 1,000)
Total spent in 
marketing (in Khs 
1,000)
Deposit in Formal 
Institutions
Table 4. Impact of DrumNet (Prior Exporters versus New Adopters)
OLS
Production of french 
beans (1,000 Kg.)
Panel A: Treatment
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